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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act' (AEDPA) into law.
This new law was part of an omnibus crime package "intended to
make it easier to prosecute anyone charged with committing or
planning to commit a terrorist attack;"2 however, it also made "a
number of major, ill-advised changes to our immigration laws
having nothing to do with fighting terrorism."3 Included in these
changes was the effective elimination of a criminal alien's ehgi-
bility to apply for a waiver of deportation.
4
1. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1214.
2. Lena Williams, A Law Aimed at Terrorists Hita Legal Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
1996, at Al.
3. President Signs Terrorism Bill Into Law, Congress Paaaea Corrections Measures,
73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 568 (Apr. 29, 1996).
4. The Anit-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act eliminated the possibility of
deportation waivers for all criminal aliens, except for those who had committed crimes
punishable by less than one year. The new law also directed immigration officials to detain
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Before the passage of AEDPA, the Section 212(c) waiver5
was the most common form of discretionary reliefD available to
criminal aliens, especially for those convicted of narcotics offenses
or crimes involving moral turpitude.7  Although Congress in-
tended the Section 212(c) waiver to be an extraordinary measure,
over the last eight years, immigration judges granted this relief
to more than half of those who applied.8 A surge of protests
emerged in response to this judicial laxity.
Amidst a tremendous anti-immigrant sentiment, Congress
tightened the laws pertaining to relief from deportation. While
this Comment argues that although some legislative action was
needed to reduce the number of waivers granted, AEDPA was
not the solution. Congress passage of AEDPA included two
harmful sections: first, it expanded grounds of deportability to
cover all drug offenses, including marijuana possession,9 and all
crimes of moral turpitude; 10 second, immigration judges could no
longer exercise their discretion to grant criminal aliens relief
from deportation. Following AEDPA, virtually all criminal aliens
were subject to immediate deportation orders and were unable to
apply for relief from deportation.
Following the enactment of AEDPA, members of Congress
recognized that "there might be certain rare circumstances we
any noncitizen convicted of a crime in the United States, including most felonies and cer-
tain misdemeanors. These residents were detained without appeal and were not eligible
for release on bond. A Law Aimed at Terrorists Hits Legal Aliens, supra note 2, at A17.
5. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988). The provi-
sions of the Section 212(c) waiver were found at the former Immigration and Nationality
Act § 212(c).
6. The Immigration and Nationality Act vests the Attorney General with a signifi-
cant amount of discretion which is exercised at all levels of the immigration process. In
particular, the Attorney General and her delegates were empowered to grant discretionary
waivers to criminal aliens who were found to be deportable or excludable and who estab-
lished that they deserved relief from deportation. Immigration and Nationality Act §
212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988).
7. For a description of eligibility requirements of the former Section 212(c) waiver,
see discussion infra Part IV.
8. 142 CONG. REC. S12,294-01, S12,295 (daily ad. Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Abraham).
9. Previously, possession of thirty grams or less was not grounds for deportation.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(2)(B)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2)(B)(1) (1994).
10. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i)
amended by Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 435 (1996) (expanding the
definition of "crimes involving moral turpitude"). For the purposes of deportability, any
crime with a sentence of one year or more would be considered a crime of moral turpitude.
Id.
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had not contemplated, when the removal of a particular alien
might not be appropriate."1' Thus, Congress recently restored
Section 212(c)-type waivers under Section 240A(a) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA).12 Congress failed, however, to
restore appeals of these determinations.
While Congress has partially restored discretionary relief for
certain aliens, various problems still exist with the reform pack-
age. First, will Section 240A(a) relief be limited as Congress has
intended? Neither Congress nor the Attorney General has
promulgated any firm guidelines for immigration judges to apply
when determining whether an alien deserves a cancellation of
deportation. As with the original Section 212(c) waiver, one may
inquire whether immigration judges will grant this modified form
of relief too freely. Second, will Section 240A(a) relief be an ef-
fective replacement for the original Section 212(c) waiver? Under
the reform law, all aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, re-
gardless of length of sentence, are barred from applying for relief
from deportation. While there must be some limit to eligibility,
Congress has expanded the definition of "aggravated felony" to
include most of the deportable crimes under the INA.' 3 Thus, this
waiver will exist only for a small percentage of aliens, thereby
removing the "safety valve" function of the discretionary
waiver.' 4 Finally, will the inability to appeal a discretionary de-
nial of Section 240A(a) be detrimental to the immigration sys-
tem? While aliens will no longer be allowed to postpone their
removal' 6 by appealing discretionary decisions of immigration
judges, the Government will also be precluded from appealing a
faulty grant of discretion. 16
11. 142 CONG. REC. S12,294-01, S12,294 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatch). Senator Hatch continued, "[flor example, an alien with one minor criminal convic-
tion several decades ago, who has clearly reformed and led an exemplary life and made
great contributions to this ountry ... ought to retain eligibility for a waiver of deportation
or exclusion.' Id.
12. illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, Division C, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996).
13. Immigration and Nationality Act S 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(iii) (1994).
14. See infra note 144.
15. The term "removal" replaces the former terms 'deportation" and 'exclusion" in
most instances under the new single-proceeding scheme of the Immigration and National-
ity Act. See Anti-Terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act § 301 (1996).
16. The full ramifications of the inability to appeal discretionary decisions are outside
the focus of this Comment.
1996]
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This Comment analyzes the Attorney General's discretion
within the context of criminal aliens seeking relief from deporta-
tion, particularly in the form of the former Section 212(c)-type
waiver. Part 1I briefly outlines the legislative history and intent
behind the restriction of waivers available to criminal aliens.
Part III discusses the genesis of certain due process entitlements
afforded to aliens and discusses the importance of allowing dis-
cretionary waivers. Part IV outlines the eligibility and statutory
requirements of the old waiver and sets out the requirements for
the new Section 240A(a) cancellation of deportation. Part V pre-
sents traditional arguments against broad judicial discretion and
explains why such discretion has been curtailed. Part VI focuses
on criminal sentencing guidelines as an example of how such
guidelines may work in an immigration context. Part VII sets
forth the benefits of judicial discretion and concludes that the re-
cent action of Congress is insufficient to guarantee certain due
process rights of aliens in removal proceedings or to preserve the
integrity of the immigration law.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DEPORTATION
WAIVERS
Since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,17 Con-
gress has enacted significant immigration reform.' 8 Beginning in
the 1960s and 1970s, Congress passed amendments to deal with
both legal and illegal immigration, but it was not until the late
1980s that Congress focused directly on the criminal alien prob-
lem.19
17. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101.1525 (1994)). This Act was enacted as a comprehen-
sive codification and revision of our nation's previous immigration, naturalization, and na-
tionality laws.
18. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 contained few provisions regulating
criminal aliens. Section 212(a)(9) provided for the exclusion of aliens who were convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude or aliens who admitted having committed such a crime,
or aliens who admitted committing acts which constitute the essential elements of such a
crime. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 212(a)(9). An alien could fall into the
criminal category of excludables by supplying information to the immigration officer, not-
withstanding the fact that there was no record of conviction or admission of the commis-
sion of a specific offense. Id. Also under the 1952 Act, an alien was deportable if convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude and sentenced to confinement for a year or more; or
who at any time after entry into the United States, was convicted of two such crimes,
whether or not confined. Id.
19. Prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 and the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986, public welfare and national security prevailed as the pri-
[Vol. 28:1
1996] 212(c) WAIVER
"In an effort to deal more effectively with the involvement of
aliens in serious criminal activities, particularly narcotics traf-
ficking,"20 Congress amended the INA by enacting the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986.21 This legislation classified all controlled sub-
stances as drugs for purposes of establishing grounds of exclusion
and deportation under immigration regulations. 22 Congress sub-
sequently established the Criminal Alien Program by enacting
Section 701 of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.23
The main thrust of the Criminal Alien Program provisions was to
subject criminal aliens to expedited deportation hearings con-
ducted while aliens were still in correctional custody.
24
mary objectives of U.S. immigration laws. See also Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577
(1798) (current version at 50 U.S.C. 21-23 (1988)); Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126,
22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943); Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988)); Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917)
(repealed 1974); Immigration Act of 1921, oh. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (1921) (repealed 1952); Refugee
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
20. 55 Fed. Reg. 24,858 (1990).
21. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified in general sections of 8 U.S.C.).
22. Id.
23. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(i)). Section
701 provides: 'In the case of an alien who is convicted of an offense which makes the alien
subject to deportation, the Attorney General shall begin any deportation proceeding as ex.
peditiously as possible after the date of the conviction." Id. § 701.
24. William R. Robie & Ira Sandron, Criminal Aliens in the Immigration System, 38
FED. B. NEWS & J. 449 (1991). Section 242(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
mandated that any alien convicted of an aggravated felony be hold without bond upon
completion of his or her sentence pending deportation proceedings and removal from the
United States. 55 Fed. Reg. 43,326 (1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 242, 287). The Attorney
General was directed not to deport incarcerated aliens until they had completed their sen-
tences in accordance with Section 242(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. The
Attorney General was required, however, to begin proceedings against aliens deportable
because of criminal convictions "as expeditiously as possible" as required by Section 242(i).
Id. These provisions mandated that criminals be taken into Immigration Service custody
to face exclusion or deportation from the United States rather than be allowed back into
the community after release from a correctional institution. Id. Section 242(a)(2) further
required that aggravated felons, as defined by Immigration and Nationality Act Section
101(a)(43), would be taken in to custody and held without bond. Id.
Criminal Alien Program cases were usually separated from the rest of the immi-
gration cases and heard by immigration judges who were part of the Criminal Alien Pro.
gram. These immigration judges either had permanent courtroom facilities at detention
centers, such as the Krome Detention Center in Miami, Florida, or made routine trips to
these facilities to hear criminal cases. Other criminal aliens who had already finished their
sentence or had been convicted without a prison sentence had their cases heard by immi.
gration judges outside of the Criminal Alien Program in the normal course of business.
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Congress then passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,25
which contained provisions enhancing the penalties for the
"aggravated felon." 26 The aggravated felon provision lent support
to the previously enacted Criminal Alien Program and required
that deportation proceedings be completed before the felon was
released from custody for the criminal sentence. 27 The interest of
the government to expedite criminal alien deportation was fur-
thered as this provision placed the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) in the position to deport the alien immediately
upon the conclusion of his sentence. This system intended not
only to accelerate the deportation process, but also to prevent the
criminal alien from returning to the streets upon release from
prison.28
Because Congress was still concerned with the need to elimi-
nate the criminal alien population within the United States, 29 the
1990 amendment to the INA broadened the immigration conse-
quences for criminal conduct to include particularly harsh treat-
ment for those aliens committing aggravated felonies. 30 Similar
to previous legislation, the purpose of the 1990 amendment was
to expedite the removal of criminal aliens and to allow fewer le-
gal remedies by making grounds of deportability more extensive
and by making waivers more difficult to obtain. 31
25. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified at various sections of 8
U.S.C.).
26. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 7342 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)). The Act de.
fined aggravated felony as murder, drug trafficking crimes, any illicit trafficking in fire-
arms or destructive devices or any attempt or conspiracy to commit such acts, committed
within the United States.
27. Id. § 7347 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)).
28. Section 242(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was amended by requiring
the Attorney General to take custody of aliens convicted of aggravated felonies upon com-
pletion of the alien's sentence and to retain such custody pending deportation. 55 Fed. Reg.
24,858 (1990). The amended procedures established by this Act were created to serve the
public interest by facilitating the detection and removal of the alien aggravated felon. Id.
29. 136 CONG. REC. S17, 117 (daily ed. Oct. 6 1990).
30. The provisions of this amendment were severe and appeared to illustrate a posi-
tion that authorized taking away the 'many rights" given to criminal aliens. Jeffrey N.
Brauwerman & Stephen E. Mander, IMMACT 90 Revisions Regarding Immigration Con-
sequences of Criminal Activity, 66 FLA. B.J. 28 (May, 1992).
31. Id. Criminal aliens who were convicted of aggravated felonies and who served
more than five years in prison were barred from applying for a waiver of deportation. Id.
at 34. Other aggravated felons serving less than five years would not merit relief absent a
showing of unusual and outstanding equities sufficient to outweigh the severity and re-
cidivism, or both, of their criminal activity. Id.
[Vol. 28:1128
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Despite all these amendments, most criminal aliens who
were deemed deportable were eligible to petition the immigration
judge for a waiver of deportation.32 Immigration judges were re-
quired to conduct hearings for discretionary relief in a fundamen-
tally fair manner 33 and were not permitted to refuse to consider
discretionary relief where the alien was prima facie eligible for
such relief.34 Thus, in addition to due process protections, crimi-
nal aliens in deportation proceedings were also afforded an extra
level of protection. Former Section 212(c) of the INA provided a
second chance to aliens with significant ties to the United States.
After being convicted of the crime and found deportable as
charged, the alien was given the opportunity to petition the judge
for relief based on relevant mitigating factors favorable to the
alien.
35
AEDPA, however, effectively eliminated this discretionary
relief for almost all classes of aliens.3 6 AEDPA enhanced the
ability of immigration officers to deport criminal aliens by elimi-
nating judicial review for aliens deemed deportable for commit-
ting aggravated felonies.8 7 AEDPA also went a step further and
recategorized most crimes involving moral turpitude as aggra-
vated felonies, thereby eliminating Section 212(c) relief for all
but the most minor criminal offenses.3 Finally, AEDPA required
32. The aggravated felon serving more than five years in prison was the only class of
alien categorically barred from applying for relief from deportation. See Immigration and
Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). This portion of Section 212(c) sparked
much controversy. The question posed was whether the provision should be interpreted to
bar only those who actually served five years or whether it should also apply to those sen-
tenced to five years. This question ultimately became moot as the new Section 212(c)-type
relief bars relief to all aggravated felons, regardless of the sentence.
33. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966);
Cunanan v. INS, 856 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1988).
34. On the other hand, an alien who was statutorily barred from relief would not be
eligible to apply for discretionary relief or to demand a hearing on relief from deportation.
Former Section 212(c) relief was unavailable to persons convicted of one or more aggra-
vated felonies if they had actually served a term of imprisonment of five years or more or if
they had served various terms of imprisonment which equal a total of five years or more.
Matter of Ramirez-Somera, BIA Int. Dec. 3185 (Aug. 11, 1992).
35. For a discussion of the discretion vested in the Attorney General, see discussion
infra Part IV. This bifurcated process resembles the criminal trial with respect to an ini-
tial trial to determine guilt and a second trial to determine sentencing.
36. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, §440(d) (to be codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(c)).
37. Id. § 440(a) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10)). Under previous law, an ag-
gravated felon was barred only if he had served five years or more in prison.
38. Id. § 435 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i)(I1)).
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custody of any alien convicted of any criminal offense.39
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibil-
ity Act of 1996,40 passed on October 1, 1996, restored waivers of
deportation available to criminal aliens under new the INA's
Section 240A(a). Congress, however, left many concerns unad-
dressed. Most important is the fact that, regardless of any miti-
gating factors, most criminal aliens found excludable or deport-
able under the INA are no longer statutorily eligible to apply for
relief from deportation.
III. "THANTOM" CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
It has long been established that aliens inside the United
States have the protection of certain constitutional safeguards.4
1
These rights are more extensive for lawful permanent residents
and others who have lived in the United States for a lengthy pe-
riod of time and who have acquired greater equities.42 These in-
dividuals stand to lose the same life, liberty, and property as
would U.S. citizens.
43
As early as 1886, the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins
44
established that regardless of citizenship or alienage there is a
"notion of fundamental human rights that protects individuals."45
Hiroshi Motomura expanded on this notion in the immigration
context and addressed the meaning of "phantom norms" in our
society. 46 Motomura characterized phantom norms as those
which have aided in the interpretation of immigration statutes,
yet have remained independent of the norms which courts use di-
rectly when they decide constitutional issues in immigration
cases. 47 Phantom norms have been important in the evolution of
immigration law as they often have yielded more favorable deci-
sions for aliens through the interpretation of statutes, regula-
39. Id. § 440(c) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
40. Pub. L. No. 104-208, Division C, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996).
41. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After A Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
42. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
43. ld. at 34.
44. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
45. Motomura, supra note 41, at 566.
46. Id. at 549. Motomura expressed his appreciation to Alexander Aleinikoff for first
suggesting the term 'phantom norms.* Id.
47. Id. at 549.
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tions, and other forms of subconstitutional law. 4 The outcome of
this process has been to "produce results that are much more
sympathetic to aliens than the results that would follow from the
interpretation of statutes in light of the expressly applicable con-
stitutional immigration law based on plenary power."49
Motomura suggests that phantom norms have been instru-
mental in making up for the shortcomings of the plenary power
doctrine.W0 Indeed, the Court has allowed phantom constitutional
48. Id.
49. Id. These phantom norms actually originated in the mainstream public law. Id.
at 549. Motomura suggests that this expansion of judicial review has its roots in Justice
Brandeis' concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), in which he stated that 'judges should interpret statutes
to avoid constitutional doubt." Motomura, supra note 41, at 561. While many commenta-
tors believe the use of such judicial interpretation of statutes to be controversial and un-
predictable, many decisions have relied on such interpretation. See generally RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985). Posner suggests that such
interpretation allows courts to alter the meaning of statutes, thereby inserting a judicially-
created "penumbra" around the Constitution. Id. See Motomura, supra note 41, at 561.
The effects of constitutional norms on statutory interpretation can clearly be seen
in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The Court held that a nonprofit
private school engaging in racially discriminatory admissions practices did not qualify for a
federal income tax exemption granted to institutions operated for religious, charitable, and
educational purposes. Id. Although Congress probably never contemplated such problems
involving racial segregation when creating the Internal Revenue Code, the Court inter-
preted the Congressional statute so that it would conform to the standard of nondiscrimi-
nation adopted by our legal culture. Motomura, supra note 41, at 562. Accordingly, the
Court refused to extend such exemptions to institutions whose activities were "contrary to
fundamental public policy." Bob Jones Univ., at 592. Many decisions such as this one have
accepted and applied background constitutional norms of racial equality as part of the
mainstream public law. See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (accepting
the background constitutional norm of racial equality as a part of mainstream public law in
holding that children restricted to all-black schools were prevented from receiving equal
educational opportunities and were thereby deprived of equal protection of laws guaran-
teed by Fourteenth Amendment).
50. Motomura, supra note 41, at 549. The plenary power doctrine begins with the
premise that every sovereign nation has the inherent power to forbid the entrance of for-
eigners within its borders, or to admit them only upon such conditions as it may see fit.
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). Thus, in order to promote na-
tional security, sovereignty, and self-preservation, our federal government has virtually
absolute power to regulate immigration. The doctrine further provides that the power and
authority of the United States to prohibit or regulate immigration of aliens is plenary. Ac-
cordingly, Congress may choose any agency to carry out its prescribed rules or policies.
Kaorn Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). Evidently, the political branches of our
government may employ this power without the threat of judicial review, as long as they
do not transcend limits of authority or abuse their discretion. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952). The exercise of this power has oftentimes resulted in the harsh treatment
of aliens by systematically wiping out the effects of the individual rights possessed by an
alien.
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norms to play a large role in decision making and statutory in-
terpretation by reading statutes in the light most favorable to
aliens. 51 The implementation of phantom constitutional norms
has been vital to the immigrant communities in the United
States and has safeguarded employment and property rights
which aliens now possess. Many Supreme Court cases have also
helped to build up the rights of aliens to where they now possess
entitlements under the Due Process Clause,
52 even in matters in-
volving immigration itself.
The absence of these norms would devastate the alien com-
munity by depriving them of the rights they have come to pos-
sess. It would further subject noncitizens to practices which are
fundamentally unfair. In fact, many of the so-called phantom
norms have become so incorporated into case law that they are
now regarded as true constitutional norms.3 Part of this ideol-
ogy forms the basis of the concept of relief from deportation. Just
as it would deprive an alien of due process to deport him without
a deportation hearing, it would be fundamentally unfair to de-
port a certain type of alien before having the opportunity to pres-
ent a case to a judge for discretionary relief.te
51. See Motomura, supra note 41, at 560.
52. In Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966), the Court held that the government must
go beyond its minimal "preponderance of the evidence" standard and establish the deport-
ability of an alien by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence." In Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Court upheld the proposition that the Constitution protects aliens
from deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process, even if their presence in
the country was unlawful, involuntary, or intransitory. The Court further established that
aliens' rights had constitutional significance. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
the Court established a three prong test in determining the constitutional sufficiency of
INS procedures to deportable aliens. The three prongs look to: 1) the interest at stake for
the individual; 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the proce-
dures used and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and 3) the govern-
ment's interest in avoiding the potential burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dure would entail. Id. at 335. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Court ruled that
even undocumented aliens were entitled to full due process and equal protection rights. In
that case, the court held that "the term 'person' used in the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments [was] broad enough to include any and every human being within the jurisdiction of
the republic," even undocumented alien school children. The Court also decided Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), which finally made real some phantom constitutional rights
in its determination that once an alien gains admission into the United States and begins
to develop the ties that accompany permanent residence, his constitutional status changes
accordingly.
53. See Motomura, supra note 41, at 580.
54. New immigration legislation only permits aliens convicted of very minor crimes
to apply for relief from deportation. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996 has defined this type of alien as a long term legal permanent resi-
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IV. AVAILABILITY OF DISCRETIONARY WAIVERS AND
EXPLORATION OF THE PARAMETERS OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
The discretionary authority vested in the Attorney General
by the INA is delegated to the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization and the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR).5 5 This Attorney General's discretionary authority pro-
vides:
Without divesting the Attorney General of any of his powers,
privileges, or duties under the immigration and naturaliza-
tion laws, and except as to the Executive Office, the Board,
the Office of the Chief Special Inquiry Officer, and Special In-
quiry Officers, there is delegated to the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization the authority of the Attorney
General to direct the administration of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and to enforce the Act and all other
laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.
The Commissioner may issue regulations as deemed neces-
sary or appropriate for the exercise of any authority delegated
to him by the Attorney General, and may redelegate any such
authority to any other officer or employee of the Service.56
The EOIR is headed by a Director, who is responsible for the
supervision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge. 57 The Director is author-
ized to redelegate the discretionary authority to the Chairman of
the BIA or the Chief Immigration Judge.5 Accordingly, the im-
dent who has committed a crime involving moral turpitude which is punishable by less
than one year. While the grant of waivers must be low, it is unjust to categorically bar
long term residents convicted of more serious crimes. illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Division C, 110 Stat. 3009
(Sept. 30, 1996). It is this Comment's position that while not all criminals deserve relief,
this type of relief must serve as a 'safety valve.' While murderers, rapists, child abusers,
and other violent offenders (aggravated felons by definition) may not claim a right to a
hearing on discretionary relief, there is a type of criminal, for example, a long term resi-
dent of the United States who is convicted ofpossession of marijuana for personal use, who
deserves a second chance. People make mistakes, and they must not be categorically
barred from applying for relief. This is not to say that they must be granted relief, but
they must have the opportunity to present their case before an impartial immigration
judge.
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migration judges are also vested with the authority to grant dis-
cretionary relief.59
Former Section 212(c) was the source of the most common
form of discretionary relief for criminal aliens. This relief was
employed primarily in cases of narcotics offenses or crimes of
moral turpitude.60 Former Section 212(c) provided:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who tempo-
rarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of
deportation, and who are returning to a lawful and unre-
linquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admit-
ted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard
to the provisions of [Section 212(a) of the Act]. 61
To be eligible for Section 212(c) relief, the alien must have
maintained a lawful unrelinquished domicile for seven consecu-
tive years.62 An alien who had been convicted of one or more ag-
gravated felonies and had served a term of imprisonment of at
least five years was not eligible for Section 212(c) relief.6 The
burden was on the alien to establish his eligibility for this relief.64
Beyond the statutory requirements, an alien requesting
Section 212(c) relief was required to demonstrate entitlement to
59. Id.
60. Section 212(c) relief was available in deportation proceedings only for grounds
analogous to grounds of excludability waiveable under Section 212(a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, BIA Int. Dec. 3147 (Jan. 11, 1990);
Matter of Wadud, 19 I & N Dec. 182 (BIA 1984); Matter of Granados, 16 1 & N Dec. 726
(BIA 1979).
61. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c) (1988) (current version
at 8 U.S.C. 1182(c) (1994)). Although the statute described a waiver under Section 212(c)
of the Act which was available to aliens seeking to eliminate a ground of inadmissibility
upon application to enter the United States, it was interpreted to include availability for
relief in deportation proceedings as well where the alien had not departed from the United
States subsequent to the acts that rendered him excludable. See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d
268 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Granados, 16 1 & N Dec. at 726; Matter of Hom, 16 1 & N Dec.
112 (BIA 1977); Matter of Wadud, 19 I & N Dec. at 182; Matter of Silva, 16 I & N Dec. 26
(BIA 1976). See also Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, BIA Int. Dec. 3147 (Jan. 11, 1990).
62. Jaramillo v. INS, 1 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1993). The date to commence computa-
tion of the seven year period for Section 212(c) relief was the date when the alien was ad.
mitted for lawful permanent residence. Matter of Newton, 17 1 & N Dec. 133 (BIA 1979).
63. Matter of Meza, BIA Int. Dec. 3146 (May 22, 1991); Matter of A-A, BIA Int. Dec.
3176 (May 15, 1992); Matter of Ramirez-Somera, BIA Int. Dec. 3185 (Aug. 11, 1992).
64. Matter of Edwards, BIA Int. Dec. 3134 (May 2, 1990); Matter of Matin, 16 I & N
Dec. 581,583 (BIA 1978).
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a favorable exercise of discretion.65 In determining whether a
grant of Section 212(c) relief appeared to be in the best interest of
the United States, the immigration judge was required to bal-
ance the adverse factors indicating the alien's undesirability as a
permanent resident with the social and human considerations
presented on his behalf.66
In order to provide the framework for an equitable applica-
tion of discretionary relief, the BIA enumerated several factors to
be considered in deciding whether Section 212(c) relief should be
granted as a matter of discretion.67 Among the factors deemed
adverse to a respondent's application were "the nature and un-
derlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue, the pres-
ence of additional significant violations of this country's immi-
gration laws, the existence of a criminal record and, if so, its
nature, recency, and seriousness, and the presence of other evi-
dence indicative of a respondent's bad character or undesirability
as permanent resident of this country."68 Favorable considera-
tions included such factors as:
family ties within the United States, residence of long dura-
tion in this country (particularly when the inception of resi-
dence occurred while the respondent was of young age), evi-
dence of hardship to the respondent and family if deportation
occurs, service in this country's Armed Forces, a history of
employment, the existence of property or business ties, evi-
dence of value and service to the community, proof of genuine
rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evidence
attesting to a respondent's good character (e.g., affidavits
from family, friends, and responsible community representa-
tives).69
The immigration judge exercised discretion in favor of the
alien when the positive factors qualitatively outweighed the ad-
verse factors.70
65. Matter of Marin, 16 1 & N at 586.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. Although in an individual case, one or more of these adverse factors could
ultimately be determinative of whether Section 212(c) relief was in fact granted, their
presence did not preclude a respondent from presenting evidence in support of a favorable
exercise of discretion. Gonzalez v. INS, 996 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1993).
69. Matter of Main, 161 & N at 584-85.
70. Id. at 586.
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In cases that involved serious negative factors, such as seri-
ous crimes or repeated criminal offenses, an applicant was re-
quired to make a showing of "unusual or outstanding equities."
71
Applications involving convicted aliens were evaluated on a case-
by-case basis,72 with rehabilitation a factor to be considered in
the exercise of discretion. 73 An immigration judge was permitted
to deny Section 212(c) relief as a matter of discretion, even when
unusual or outstanding equities were shown.74 Indeed, the BIA
determined that Section 212(c) relief was not an indiscriminate
waiver for all who demonstrated statutory eligibility for such re-
lief.75 Instead, the Attorney General and her delegates were re-
quired to determine as a matter of discretion whether an appli-
cant warranted the desired relief.
76
The exercise of this discretionary power varied greatly be-
tween immigration judges nationwide and within different EOIR
districts. For example, in three and a half years of serving as an
immigration judge in the Criminal Alien Program, one Miami
immigration judge recalled granting only four or five Section
212(c) discretionary waivers.77 The judge stated that the reasons
for this were because while in prison or INS detention, the alien
really had no track record, could not prove rehabilitation, and
was oftentimes unrepresented.78 Waivers from such judges 79
71. Matter of Edwards, 20 I & N Dec. 191 (BIA 1994); Matter of Buscemi, 19 I & N
Dec. 828 (BIA 1988); Matter of Matin, 16 1 & N at 586. Upon consideration of the record as
a whole, the immigration judge was required to find that the respondent had demonstrated
sufficient unusual or outstanding equities necessary to overcome the very serious negative
factor of his of her criminal activity.
72. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that an immigration judge may
not reassess an alien's ultimate guilt or innocence of a criminal conviction. Matter of Rob.
erts, BIA Int. Dec. 3148 (May 1, 1991). Therefore, an immigration judge is bound by the
record of conviction and must consider the respondent to be guilty of the offense for which
he or she was convicted. Id.
73. Id. See Matter of Edwards, BIA Int. Dec. 3134 (May 2, 1994).
74. Matter of Marin, 16 1 & N at 586.
75. Gonzalez v. INS, 996 F.2d at 804.
76. Id. See also Ashby v. INS, 961 F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir. 1992). The Ashby court
recognized that the Attorney General had unusually broad discretion in granting and de-
nying Section 212(c) waivers, and the alien bore the difficult burden of demonstrating to
the Attorney General that the application merited favorable consideration.
77. Telephone Interview with United States Immigration Judge (Mar. 15, 1996).
78. Id. Further, the fact that the alien was incarcerated generally meant that he had
been convicted of one serious crime or a string of crimes. Aliens with long criminal records
or a conviction for a particularly serious crime necessarily had a slimmer chance of obtain-
ing relief.
79. Id. This judge believed that the Immigration and Nationality Act provision allow-
ing Section 212(c) waivers was an excellent measure. Such discretionary relief served as a
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were few in number, however, statistics from the Executive Of-
fice for Immigration Review clearly show that this immigration
judge's restrained exercise of power was the exception.80 The de-
cisions of immigration judges were far from uniform.
The BIA was given authority to review discretionary deci-
sions of immigration judges de novo in order to ensure uniformity
of decision-making regarding Section 212(c) waivers.8' On appeal
from a Section 212(c) decision, the alien was permitted to present
testimony and evidence so that the BIA could re-apply the Matter
of Marin standards8 2 to the facts of the case and make its own
determination. If unsatisfied with the appellate result, the alien
could then appeal to the circuit court. Decisions of the BIA
were reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard84 and
safety valve for people who had spent a long time in the United States and allowed them
the opportunity to show that they merited relief from deportation, as immediate deporta-
tion is often viewed as a harsh punishment reserved for serious criminal activity.
80. CHART: EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW STATISTICS FOR ALL
IMMIGRATION JUDGES:
GRANTS DENIALS OQTHERS TOTAL
FY89 970 802 276 2,048
FY90 1,049 985 421 2,455
FY91 1,374 1,242 645 3,261
FY92 1,591 1,705 728 4,024
FY93 1,686 1,696 732 4,114
FY94 1,778 1,678 678 4,134
FY95 2,303 2,012 1,015 5,330
NOTE: The 'others' category reflects aliens who either withdrew their applications; were
found to be ineligible after filing; or had their cases terminated upon a finding that they
were citizens.
81. Matter of Burbano, BIA Int. Dec. 3229 (Sept. 13, 1994).
82. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
83. Subsequent to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Division C, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996), this review is no
longer available.
84. Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1982). This court stated that "[e]ven where
an appellate court has power to review the exercise of such discretion, the inquiry is con-
fined to whether such situation and circumstances clearly show an abuse of discretion, that
is, arbitrary action not justifiable in view of such situation and circumstances." Id. at 1161
(quoting NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Co-op, Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1960)
(quoting Hartford-Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 95 F.2d 414, 417 (9th Cir. 1948)).
The Sixth Circuit described the appropriate standard of review as follows: in determining
whether the Board of Immigration Appeals abused its discretion, the court is required to
decide whether the denial of discretionary relief was made "without a rational explanation,
inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as
invidious discrimination against a particular race or group." Balani, at 1161. See also
Casalena v. INS, 984 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1993). Most circuits have adopted similar lan-
guage. In the absence of a demonstration that the Board of Immigration Appeals acted in
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were upheld unless found arbitrary or capricious.8 5  The mere
fact that the BIA may have reached a different result was incon-
sequential.8 6
It is apparent that the former Section 212(c) scheme allowed
for abuse on the part of an alien who wanted to postpone his de-
portation. Moreover, it is evident that the EOIR, BIA, and INS
did not always cooperate in order to carry out the express intent
of Congress, because waivers were granted too frequently.
8 7 It is
unclear whether INS ever had an affirmative policy of appealing
the grants of Section 212(c) waivers or whether the BIA merely
affirmed the appealed grants, but it is indisputed that the large
number of grants resulted in the release of these criminal aliens
into the streets. Where the BIA was bound to ensure uniformity
of decision-making regarding Section 212(c) waivers, it should
have used its de novo review to ensure that the Matter of Matin
standards were applied uniformly.
The new Section 240A(a) relief purports to restrict the num-
ber of criminal aliens who are granted permission to remain in
the United States and provides:
The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an
alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United
States if the alien (1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence for not less than five years, (2) has re-
sided in the United States continuously for seven years after
having been admitted in any status, and (3) has not been
convicted of any aggravated felony.88
This "new section 240A establishes revised rules for the type
of relief that [was] ... available to excludable and deportable ali-
ens under section 212(c)." 9 This provision is "intended to replace
and modify the form of relief [previously] granted under section
212(c) of the INA."90
an irrational or impermissible manner, the court was not permitted to rebalance the equi-
ties.
85. Balani, 669 F.2d at 1161.
86. Id.
87. See statement of Sen. Abraham aupra note 8.
88. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(a).
89. 142 CoNG. REc. H10841.02, H10896 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1996) (Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference).
90. Id.
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Congress explicitly stated that this relief is intended only for
"highly unusual cases involving outstanding aliens."91 But apart
from defining extraordinary circumstances necessary for a grant
of this relief to include the "insignificance of the crime" and the
"substantial contributions to society made by the alien,"92 Con-
gress did not enumerate any guidelines or standards by which to
evaluate the applications for cancellation of deportation.
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST BROAD JUDICIAL DISCRETION
It has been argued that although the deportation process
possesses many of the protections available in any legal system,
relief from deportation has been restricted dramatically by the
broad discretion vested in the Attorney General. 93 In some in-
stances, critics have urged that "discretion has been used as a
catchword that justifies potentially arbitrary immigration deci-
sion making... and [which] has often become a mantle insulat-
ing immigration decisions from meaningful review."94 These
critics strongly disapprove of the plenary power doctrine. 95 They
also fear the immunization of immigration legislation against
constitutional review 96 and the exercise of discretion without




93. Michael G. Heyman, Judicial Review of Discretionary Immigration Deciaionmak-
ing, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861 (1994) (arguing that aliens are outsiders in our country, not
only separate from our national community, but outsiders to our legal system).
94. Id. at 862.
95. Id. Heyman states that although 'the plenary power doctrine technically applies
only to constitutional attacks on immigration legislation, its judicial adoption reflects a
mood decidedly unfavorable to aliens." Id. at 862. This mood is intensified by the fact that
'an alien seeking a favorable exercise of discretion is usually someone subject to deporta.
tion. Thus, having violated our immigration laws, she then turns to the system seeking
discretionary relief. She appeals to our compassion, seeking to remain in this country. Yet
such a claim seems incompatible with an entitlement' Id. at 863. Heyman then states that
it is easy to see how discretionary decisionmaking regarding aliens 'would seem an un-
likely candidate for rigorous judicial review." Id.
96. Id. at 864. Indeed, many immigration decisions are developed through adminis-
trative action and the courts have recently accorded great deference to agency construc-
tion of silent or ambiguous statutes. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). "Although the Administrative Procedure Act permits a re-
viewing court to set aside agency action found to be 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,' it also protects 'matters committed to
agency discretion' from judicial review." 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 706 (1988).
97. Heyman, supra note 93. Heyman states that discretion seems to mean "power
unconstrained by legal rules." Id. at 865. In that sense, it seems that "the notion of review
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The first argument advanced against broad judicial discre-
tion is the notion that the decision-maker acts without constraint
and proceeds differently from case to case. 98 Supporters of this
argument believe that unless discretion is guided by stringent le-
gal standards, "the possibility of inconsistent and arbitrary deci-
sion making is always present."99 Without guidelines placed on
the decision-maker, discretion can easily be viewed as license,
especially when the finality of a decision makes the unanswer-
able to any reviewing body.10e
A second argument against broad judicial discretion is that
discretion never remains constant throughout all cases and
among all decision-makers. 101 Each judge is constrained by his
own socialization and training. 10 2 In this respect, it is difficult to
find a body of shared social and ethical values among decision-
makers. 03 Consequently, results will necessarily differ from one
judge to another and results of Section 212(c) cases will lack uni-
formity 0 4
A third argument suggests that within the area of discre-
tionary decision making, a judge is less likely to be reviewed
than when guided by statutes, regulation, and precedent. 10 5
Ironically, "discretionary decisions of this kind are justified not
because they are correct, but because they are close enough, and
making a finer determination is either not possible or not worth
the time and effort."1°6
A fourth argument claims that immigration judges are lesser
officials and the quality of their decisions may not warrant defer-
ence. 10 This argument has been further enhanced by the influx
of discretion is doomed for the following reason: one cannot determine if discretion is
abused if no determinate standards exist for its use. Id.
98. Id. at 878.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 878-83.
101. Id. at 882.
102. Id. at 886.
103. Id.
104. Id. See Matter of Burbano, BIA Int. Dec. 3229 (Sept. 13, 1994) (stating that the
most important policy objective in applying a de novo standard of review for Section 212(c)
cases is to assure uniformity of decision-making).
105. Jeffrey L. Romig, Administrative Review of Cases Involving the Exercise of Dis-
cretion Under Section 212(c): Should the Board of Immigration Appeals Adopt an "Abuse of
Discretion" Standard?, 9 GEO. llMMIGR. L.J. 63, 72 (1995).
106. Heyman, supra note 93, at 884 (quoting Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's
Hunch. An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 269-70 (1990)).
107. Romig, supra note 105, at 72 (1995).
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of new, inexperienced immigration judges who are vested with
great discretionary authority immediately upon their induc-
tion. 1 0
These critics, and even some courts, appear to be under the
mistaken impression that Section 212(c) relief was rarely ever
granted.'t 9 In Gonzalez v. INS, 10 the INS was asked to provide
the circuit court panel with BIA decisions which granted Section
212(c) discretionary relief to aliens convicted of drug offenses.
Although more than three thousand of the BINs decisions had
been published at that time,"' the INS could only provide the
panel with a single decision granting Section 212(c) relief to an
alien." 2 The INS was unable to provide the court with any other
decisions, published or unpublished, in which the BIA exercised
its discretion in favor of an alien convicted of a serious drug of-
fense." 3 The Gonzalez court noted that the BIA does not keep
108. Id.
109. In fact, these critics of broad judicial discretion did not realize how lucky criminal
aliens applying for Section 212(c) relief were. The same 'unfettered" judicial discretion
that they criticize was instrumental in granting Section 212(c) relief to over half of those
that applied. See CHART, supra note 80.
110. Gonzalez, 996 F.2d at 810. Gonzalez was convicted of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute
approximately two kilograms of cocaine. She was found deportable as charged under Sec-
tion 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) for commission of an aggravated felony and Section 1251(a)(2) (13)(1)
for trafficking of controlled substances. The immigration judge denied her request for
Section 212(c) relief after he "considered the testimony and evidence in a manner consis-
tent with the Matin balancing approach and the factors enumerated by the BIA and con-
cluded that Gonzalez had not demonstrated sufficiently outstanding or unusual equities to
warrant Section 212(c) relief.' Id. at 809. Specifically, while the immigration judge noted
that many of her positive factors were commendable, they did not rise to the level of un-
usual or outstanding equities necessary to negate the nature, severity, and recency of the
drug crime. He further refused to find that rehabilitation had been established where the
respondent '[sought] to place the blame of her offense on her co-defendants and [did] not
accept responsibility for her own actions." Id. On appeal, the BIA rebalanced the relevant
factors and concluded that discretionary relief was not warranted. On appeal to the Sixth
Circuit, the respondent asserted that the BIA had abused its discretion in failing to weigh
the respondent's equities in her favor. She argued that the denial of discretionary relief
based largely upon a conviction for a single crime was an abuse of discretion constituting
'a de facto ruling that immigrants convicted of a single, though admittedly, serious drug
crime will never warrant a favorable grant of discretionary relief even though Congress
has expressed a contrary intent." Id.
111. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ACTIVITIES 1992-1993 at 69
(1992).
112. Gonzalez, 996 F.2d at 810. For the only Section 212(c) grant, see Matter of Mor-
robel, A30 924 038 (BIA 1993) (granting Section 212(c) relief to an alien who had been
convicted for an attempt to sell $20 worth of cocaine).
113. Gonzalez, 996 F.2d at 810. The court recognized that the BIA hears only a small
percentage of the total number of cases heard by immigration judges yet stated that 'this
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statistics of grants and denials of Section 212(c) relief with re-
gard to drug cases or any cases other than the gross numbers of
appeals. 114 Under an abuse of discretion standard, the court re-
luctantly affirmed the BIA, stating that although it would have
come to a different conclusion, there was no evidence to suggest
that the BIA acted in an irrational or impermissible manner.'1 5
As such, the BIA's decision was left undisturbed. In dictum,
however, the court expressed disapproval that the Attorney Gen-
eral generally failed to exercise discretion favorably to certain
classes of aliens.
116
The Gonzalez decision sheds light on an interesting situa-
tion: the administration's unwillingness to "come clean" with the
huge number of former Section 212(c) grants, and consequently,
the huge numbers of criminal aliens released into society. In
light of the alarming number of grants, it is not surprising that
the number of former Section 212(c) grants was not publicized.
Congress recognized this problem during its latest attempt
to reform discretionary relief. In an effort to ensure that discre-
tionary relief would be more difficult to obtain, Congress effec-
tively eliminated what was left of the Attorney General's discre-
tion. While the loose Matter of Marin standards were not able to
ensure the conservative grant of Section 212(c)-type relief, per-
haps Congress should have considered a different solution to the
problem other than eliminating administrative discretion in the
immigration context.
VI. THE EXAMPLE OF CREIMINAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
In response to the broad disparity in criminal sentencing
across the nation, Congress voted to enact and the President
signed into law the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA)." 7 Un-
does not diminish the fact that, in cases which do eventually reach the BIA, the BIA's lack
of the exercise of discretion left the impression that it had a policy of not granting a Sec-
tion 212(c) waiver in a case where an alien has been convicted of a serious drug offense.'
Id. The court went on to declare that "such a policy, if it does exist, appears to be an unau-




117. THOMAS W. HUTCHISON & DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND
PRACTICE (1989). Congress' three basic objectives were: 1) "to enhance the ability of the
criminal justice system to reduce crime through an effective, fair sentencing system," Id. at
2; 2) to seek "uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences irn-
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der the SRA,118 Congress authorized the creation of the United
States Sentencing Commission (Commission) to address the
problem of sentencing disparity inherent in a criminal sentencing
system which granted "unfettered discretion... [to] judges and
parole authorities responsible for imposing and implementing the
sentence."119 Federal courts began sentencing under the initial
set of guidelines on November 1, 1987. 120 At the time, the
guidelines were to apply to approximately ninety percent of all
cases in the federal courts.
121
The Commission created categories of offense behavior and
offender characteristics and prescribed "guideline ranges that
specif[ied] an appropriate sentence for each class of convicted
persons, to be determined by coordinating the offense behavior
categories with the offender characteristic categories." 122 The
SRA then required federal judges to impose upon convicted de-
fendants a sentence consonant with these sentencing guide-
lines,123 unless there was a factor present for which the guide-
lines did not adequately account.124
posed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct by similar offenders," Id. at
3; and 3) to seek "proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropri-
ately different sentences for criminal conduct of different severity." Id.
118. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2017 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991.998 (Supp. V
1987)).
119. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3221-29.
120. HUTCHISON & YELLEN, supra note 117, at 2. These guidelines were drafted by the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, 'an independent agency in the judicial branch composed of
seven voting and two nonvoting, ex officio members." Id. at 1. The principal purpose of
the Commission was to 'establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal
justice system that would assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines
prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes." Id. The
guidelines and policy statements promulgated by the Commission are issued pursuant to
Section 994(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act. Id.
121. Id.
122. HUTCHISON & YELLEN, 8upra note 117, at 2.
123. Id. "The statute contemplates the guidelines will establish a range of sentences
for every coordination of categories. Where the guidelines call for imprisonment, the range
must be narrow: the maximum imprisonment cannot exceed the minimum by more than
the greater of 25 percent or six months." 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1994).
124. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1993), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3221-29. There was substantial debate in Congress about what impact the Act and
the guidelines would have upon judicial discretion and prosecutorial discretion. Despite
warnings that prosecutorial discretion was being enhanced at the expense of judicial dis-
cretion, Congress and the President determined to go ahead, and the Sentencing Reform
Act became law.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
In a case which presents "an aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstance ... that was not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission," 12 the SRA allows the judge to
depart from the guidelines and sentence outside the range, al-
though the judge is required to specify the reasons for doing 80.126
"When a judge encounters an atypical case, one to which a par-
ticular guideline applies linguistically but in which conduct sig-
nificantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether
a departure is warranted."
27
In creating the guidelines, the Commission sanctioned the
use of departure for "unusual cases outside the range of the more
typical offenses, yet expected these occurrences to be rare."
128
The Commission articulated two basic reasons for this departure
policy. First was the difficulty in creating "a single set of guide-
lines which encompasses the vast range of human conduct po-
tentially relevant to a sentencing decision."129 Second was the
Commission's belief "that despite the legal freedom to depart
from the guidelines, the courts would not do so very often." 30
Moreover, if the judge departs from the guideline range, an ap-
pellate court may review the reasonableness of the departure.' 3 '
The Commission believed that by monitoring courts' departures
from the guidelines and their stated reasons for doing so, it
would be able to create more accurate guidelines. 3 2
This sentencing system provides the most practical and
comprehensive manner in which to effectively punish and deter
criminals for the commission of specific crimes. The argument is
further bolstered by the fact that a sentencing judge may depart
from the guidelines for important distinctions which are not fully
considered. 133 This is especially important when it is impractical
and impossible to create a sentencing system which predicts
125. HUTCHISON & YELLEN, supra note 117, at 8. "In principle, the Commission, by
specifying that it has adequately considered a particular factor, can prevent a court from
using it as grounds for departure." Id.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id. at 8. The Commission has set out a few factors, such as race, sex, national
origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic status, that the court cannot take into account as
grounds for departure. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 9.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2.




every conceivable feature of criminal behavior. Such a system
would become tremendously burdensome and would "comp-
romise the certainty of punishment and its deterrent effect."
13 4
On the other hand, a retreat to the simple, broad-category ap-
proach granting judges the "discretion to select the proper point
along a broad sentencing range"135 would result in "correspond-
ingly broad disparity in sentencing,"136 with different courts ex-
ercising their discretionary powers in different ways.1
3 7
Critics argue that in the case of mandatory minimum sen-
tences, many criminals are not receiving punishment that fits
the crime.138 They contend that while many prisoners are serv-
ing life sentences for the sale of marijuana, technically a drug
trafficking crime, other criminals are serving lesser sentences. 3 9
Rapists, robbers, and murderers are being paroled to make room
for first-time drug offenders serving lengthy, mandatory-
minimum sentences as prescribed by the SRA.140 Ironically, the
crackdown on the drug problem appears to leave other major of-
fenses virtually and comparatively unpunished.
Critics further contend that such a system takes away vir-
tually all discretion from judges where a crime perfectly fits a
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. at 34.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), the Court upheld a mandatory
life sentence without the possibility of parole for a first-time offender for possession of co-
caine. The Michigan statute, like the federal guidelines, prevented the sentencing judge
from considering any mitigating factors or the defendant's individualized characteristics.
In affirming the sentence, the Court sent a clear signal that "criminal sentencing and pun-
ishment are the tasks of the legislature, not the courts." See Mark A. Paschke, Harmelin
v. Michigan: Punishment Need Not Fit the Crime, 23 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 273 (1992). Paschke
states that "[c]onsequently, legislative discretion in criminal sentencing may go unchecked,
resulting in no constitutional protection against punishment that does not 'fit' the crime."
Id. at 274.
139. Paschke, supra note 138.
140. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2705-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy de-
termined that "society considers the possession of drugs to be more serious than second
degree murder, rape, and armed robbery." Id. In his article, however, Paschke indicated
that "[p]ublic opinion polls demonstrate that in general, murder and rape are considered
more serious offenses than drug offenses." Paschke, supra note 138, at 305 n.224. He
claimed that "[t]his is evidenced by the fact that a clear majority of the public favors capi-
tal punishment for murder and rape, but not for dealing drugs." Id. However, there is
evidence that indicates otherwise. See President's Address to the Nation on the National
Drug Control Strategy, 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1136 (Sept. 5, 1989) (stating that drugs are the
gravest domestic threat facing our nation today).
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particular category of the sentencing guidelines and vests the
prosecutors with an extraordinary degree of power. Yet, a crimi-
nal sentencing judge may depart from the guidelines to weigh
the defendant's criminal history against any circumstance that
could mitigate the degree of punishment.
Criminal sentencing guidelines have been in effect for nearly
a decade. The guidelines provide for uniformity and predictabil-
ity. While judges may depart from these guidelines, they are
aware of the fact that departure is not generally warranted.
Still, an attorney with a good case will be able to make an argu-
ment for departure.
The immigration guidelines imposed by the BIA for the ad-
judication of former Section 212(c) applications 4 were much
more flexible than these sentencing guidelines. They provided
more discretion to the Attorney General and her delegates, who
although in the best position to evaluate the factors present in
the alien's case, 42 tended to grant relief too generously. Unlike
the criminal sentencing guidelines, the guidelines set up in Mat-
ter of Matin merely provided guidance to immigration judges in
exercising discretion and in no way deterred them from weighing
additional factors in favor of the alien.143 The same broad dis-
cretion which sparked Congress to initiate the criminal sentenc-
ing guidelines existed with the Attorney General under former
legislation.
44
Although decision-making of immigration judges does not go
unchecked, these immigration judges apparently contributed to
the huge number of grants of former Section 212(c) waivers.
Stringent guidelines similar to the criminal sentencing guidelines
141. Matter of Main, 161 & N Dec. at 581.
142. In Matter of Burbano, BIA Int. Dec. 3229 (Sept. 13, 1994), the BIA commented
that "the immigration judge who presides over a case has certain observational advantages
due to his or her presence at the exclusion or deportation hearing." Id.
143. In Matter of Edwards, 20 I & N Dec. 191 (BIA 1994), members of the Board of
Immigration Appeals stated that 'it is the Board's purpose to provide guidance in the ex-
ercise of discretion in these areas but... it is not the Board's intention to provide a for-
mula that should be rigidly followed." Id. Another member of the BIA stated that "[ilt
may well be that any attempt to formulate a method for exercising 'discretion' is doomed to
be either too broad or too narrow, and that rough formulas may be all that one can devise."
Id.
144. The Attorney General was given the discretion to grant such waivers by statute
and it was her duty to define it. Had the Attorney General promulgated regulations for




would have benefited the immigration system. Such guidelines
could easily been enacted by Congress or promulgated by the At-
torney General in the Code of Federal Regulations. The immi-
gration judges would then have the ability to hear all cases and
to depart from the guidelines if justified, yet would be aware of
the strong congressional presumption against departure from the
guidelines.
Just as previous legislation, the immigration reform law fails
to give any guidelines to the Attorney General and merely states
that relief from deportation is extraordinary relief.145 It sets
forth vague standards, but fails to define when relief should be
granted. Where the law is so ambiguous, results can never be
equitable. It is the absolute duty of the Attorney General to de-
fine these guidelines to ensure that relief is correctly awarded.
Relief will either be too freely granted or too often denied. It is
unclear at this point whether the new system and its standards
will be uniformly applied.
VII. CONCLUSION
Under previous law, when an alien was found deportable, he
or she was permitted to request relief from deportation if prima
facie eligible for any such relief. In essence, the alien asked the
judge to consider any redeeming characteristics the alien still
possessed despite his or her criminal activity. AEDPA, however,
eliminated virtually all relief formerly available to long-term le-
gal residents and precluded immigration judges from taking into
account the seriousness of the crimes or the individual circum-
stances of each alien. Thus, all noncitizens were to be treated
alike, even those who had not committed violent offenses, those
who were not repeat offenders, and those who were longtime
residents of the United States and had rehabilitated themselves.
It was, and still is, a matter of fundamental fairness to allow
these aliens to petition the judge for relief. To refuse such review
would be in conflict with the due process rights which aliens in
removal proceedings possess.
Indeed, judicial discretion benefits the alien and the depor-
tation process in various ways. Discretionary power is given to
courts in order to individualize the application of law, by making
145. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, supra note 89.
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it flexible and adaptable to circumstances. 146 Without it, the law
is more likely to be criticized as harsh and unjust.147 Formerly,
the Attorney General was vested with the authority to exercise
discretion in order to minimize the harsh consequences that de-
portation imposes on aliens and their families by allowing, in cer-
tain circumstances, a waiver of deportation. 1
48 Now, most crimi-
nal aliens are no longer eligible for this relief, and they are
subject to a more stringent law requiring immediate deportation
upon a final order of deportation. These aliens are no longer al-
lowed to present their arguments to a judge and to prove that
they have accepted full responsibility for their criminal behavior,
shown attempts at and proof of rehabilitation, and contributed to
society in a way that would make them favorable candidates to
remain in the United States. Although the cancellation of depor-
tation is far from an entitlement, there should be a larger pool of
candidates statutorily eligible to petition for discretionary relief.
While indiscriminately allowing any convicted alien to re-
main in the United States imposes a huge cost on society, a sys-
tem which mandates the immediate deportation of all criminal
aliens imposes unduly harsh consequences on someone who has
spent a significant amount of time and effort settling in the
United States.
Critics of broad judicial discretion suggest that such discre-
tion has lead to procedural arbitrariness and great injustice to
the criminal alien population.149 What they do not realize is that
the discretion they criticize is the same discretion that lead to the
grant of over half of all Section 212(c) waivers in the last eight
years. While there must be some solution to the disparity in dis-
cretionary relief, discretion is too important to eliminate. The
Attorney General should take greater responsibility in promul-
gating appropriate regulations for immigration judges to follow.
In the alternative, Congress should consider setting reasonable
guidelines which the Attorney General and her delegates must
follow unless, in the judge's opinion, there is good reason to de-
146. Gonzalez, 996 F.2d at 811 (quoting DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION
TO LAW 363 (1980)).
147. Id. at811.
148. Id. "Deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment
or exile." Id. "It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a for.
feiture is a penalty.' Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (quoting Fong Haw Tan
v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948)).
149. See supra Part V.
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part. As with the criminal sentencing guidelines, departure in
the immigration context should require a written justification.
Stringent standards which subject immigration judges to imme-
diate reversal at the BIA will remind them of congressional in-
tent to make relief extraordinary. At the same time, justified de-
parture would allow for relief for those who made a terrible
mistake, but who have rehabilitated and have contributed to so-
ciety. It is in this context that the preservation of discretion in
the criminal alien context would yield greater equity in the long
run to both aliens and the judicial system.
The Attorney General has been vested with the discretion to
determine whether allowing the alien to remain in the United
States is in the best interest of our society because the Attorney
General, and the immigration judges as her delegates, are in the
best position to do so.1w Many were outraged that the majority
of former Section 212(c) cases were granted, but, by categorically
barring almost all classes of aliens from applying for relief, Con-
gress has unnecessarily removed almost all of this discretion. An
alien, previously eligible for former Section 212(c) relief, no
longer has the opportunity to prove his case before an impartial
judge. The judge will no longer evaluate the alien's demeanor
and sincerity. An alien who has committed a single offense,
served out a minimal sentence with time off for good behavior,
assimilated back into society, compiled a good and continuous
employment history since his release from prison, and has begun
on a path of rehabilitation, is no longer able to obtain relief.
While we must impose a difficult burden on those attempting
to establish eligibility for relief, we must not limit eligibility as
drastically as it has been by recent legislation. In order to pro-
150, A Miami immigration judge stated that he would feel totally deprived if he did
not have the opportunity to observe the alien in court. He stated that there is an impor-
tant subjective component in the granting of a discretionary waiver which is essential in
determining the alien's eligibility for relief. This immigration judge remarked that he be-
gins to assess the alien from the moment he walks into the courtroom. Among many fac-
tors, this immigration judge assesses the way the aliens walk, the manner in which they
carry themselves, whether they maintain eye contact and whether they fidget in their
seats. He stated that a judge cannot decide on gut feeling alone, but that one develops a
sixth sense after years of sitting on the bench. It becomes easier to distinguish between
those that are lying and those who are stretching the truth. He also stated that in close
cases, he enters into dialog with the alien. Sometimes he may ask, 'How do I know you're
not going to commit these crimes again?' or 'Tell me something about yourself. .... Of-
tentimes, this answer will put the alien over the top. Telephone Interview with United
States Immigration Judge (Mar. 15, 1996).
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tect the due process rights which resident aliens possess in im-
migration proceedings, the Attorney General must retain the dis-
cretionary authority to hear all deserving cases and grant waiv-
ers of deportation when appropriate.
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